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Abstract. We study non-binding procurement auctions where both price and non-
price characteristics of bidders matter for being awarded a contract. The outcome of such
auctions critically depends on how information is distributed among bidders during the
bidding process. As we show theoretically, whether it is in the buyer’s interest to conceal or
to disclose non-price information most importantly depends on how important the quality
aspects of the good to be procured are to the buyer: The more important the quality aspects
are to the buyer, the more interesting concealment becomes. We then empirically study the
impact of a change in the information structure using data from a large European online
procurement platform for different categories of goods. In a counterfactual analysis we
analyze the reduction of non-price information available to the bidders. In the data we find
that the choice of information structure indeed matters. Confirming the hypothesis obtained
in our theoretical framework, we find that in auction categories where bidders’ non-price
characteristics are of little importance for the decisions of the buyers, concealment of non-
price information decreases buyers’ welfare by up to 6% due to reduced competitive pressure
leading to higher bids. In contrast, for categories where bidders’ non-price characteristics
strongly influence buyers’ decisions concealment of non-price information increases buyers’
welfare by up to 15%.
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1 Introduction
When procuring a contract, the buyer often is not only interested in the price of an
offer but also in other, non-price dimensions such as technical characteristics of the good
or time of delivery. A by now quite well studied multidimensional auction format is given
by scoring auctions where buyers prior to the bidding process establish a binding scoring
rule. Besides such highly structured auctions, recently “non-binding” or “buyer-determined”
auctions became increasingly important. In these auctions buyers can freely assign the
contract after bidding has taken place. Currently this auction format seems to establish
itself as the most prominent one for online marketplaces both for private and commercial
contractors.1
When designing non-binding procurement auctions, typically no structure is imposed on
the buyer’s decision process - he is entirely free to choose any of the submitted bids. Impor-
tant design questions arise, however, with respect to the optimal information structure for
the bidding process. That is, bidders can be provided with different levels of information re-
garding the prices and the non-price characteristics of rival offers. Non-binding procurement
auctions can be open-bid or sealed-bid auctions. If a non-binding auction is a sealed bid auc-
tion, bidders are usually neither informed about their rivals’ prices nor their rivals’ non-price
characteristics. However, in this article we do not deal with sealed-bid auctions. Instead,
we are interested in open non-binding procurement auctions. In open non-binding auctions
bidders are informed about their rivals’ prices throughout the bidding process. The design
question which arises here with regard to the information structure is whether information
about their rivals’ non-price characteristics is disclosed to or concealed from bidders.
In the present article we shed light on the optimal design of the information structure of
open non-binding reverse auctions, using an extensive dataset from a large European online
procurement platform. Our analysis focuses on the impact of transparency of the auction
1See Jap (2002, 2003), Jap and Haruvy (2008), and compare for example the platform FedBid, Inc.,
where US government agencies have procured more than $4.1 billion worth of purchases since 2008 using
non-binding auctions.
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design with respect to bidders’ non-price characteristics. In particular, we are interested in
the effect of concealment of non-price information on the auction outcome. Theoretically,
we find that the effect of concealment of non-price information depends on how the buyer
weighs bidders’ non-price characteristics against bidders’ prices. We then do a counterfac-
tual analysis to assess the relevance of this finding for applications in the field. If non-price
information was concealed from the bidders, we would expect aggregate welfare of the buy-
ers to increase by up to 15% for auction-categories where non-price characteristics heavily
influence buyers’ decisions. The reason is that concealment of non-price information makes
bidders appear more similar to each other, which increases competitive pressure and leads to
lower bids. In contrast, in auction-categories where bidders’ non-price characteristics only
weakly influence buyers’ decisions, in case non-price information were concealed we would
expect aggregate welfare of the buyers to decrease by up to 6%.
Our analysis proceeds as follows: First, we establish two formal frameworks which de-
scribe two limiting cases of information structures. In the first case, bidders are fully informed
about the non-price characteristics of their rivals. In the second case, all non-price informa-
tion is concealed from the bidders. We show that whether it is beneficial for buyers to reveal
non-price information depends on characteristics of the market considered, namely the rela-
tionship between the differences in the bidders’ costs and that in their qualities. A bidder’s
quality simply denotes how buyers value that bidder’s non-price characteristics. The main
intuition here is that when bidders are quite different in terms of how their non-price charac-
teristics are valued by the buyers, then concealment of non-price information makes bidders
appear more similar than they actually are, which toughens competition among bidders and
in turn increases buyers’ welfare.
Our empirical analysis is based on a detailed data set of an online procurement plat-
form, where subscribed buyers post their tenders and can freely choose among the posted
bids. For the period of observation all non-price information is publicly available to bidders.
As a first step of our empirical analysis, for different auction categories we analyze how
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buyers value bidders’ non-price characteristics. We then verify whether bidders indeed are
aware of the buyers’ preferences over their own and their rivals’ non-price characteristics.
Our theoretical frameworks imply that in this case, contrary to the case where non-price
information is concealed from the bidders, the bids should directly take into account the
non-price characteristics of rivals’ bids. By exploiting the fact that a subset of bidders is
observed to participate in several auctions, we are able to identify the bidders’ reactions to
changing compositions of their rivals’ non-price characteristics. We find that bidders submit
significantly lower bids when confronted with rivals whose non-price characteristics are very
valuable for the buyer.
After showing that bidders’ observed behavior is indeed in line with our model for the
case of disclosed non-price information, we conduct a counterfactual analysis to assess the
economic significance of concealment of quality information for applications in the field.
Using our model for the case of disclosed non-price information, we first derive estimates
of the bidders’ costs. We find that bidders’ markups, which we compute using our cost
estimates, are of expected size and in line with economic intuition. We then use these cost
estimates together with our model for the case of concealed non-price information to compute
bidders’ counterfactual prices. With these we finally calculate the change in the aggregate
welfare of the buyers in case non-price information is concealed from the bidders. We do this
for several job-categories which differ with respect to the relevance of non-price characteristics
for buyers’ decisions. We find that our theoretical predictions are of direct practical relevance
for the dataset considered: For job-categories where non-price characteristics are of rather
low importance (in our sample “moving” and “painting”), our counterfactual results show
that in case non-price information were concealed bidders’ prices would increase and the
number of closed deals would decrease. In effect, buyers’ aggregate welfare would decrease
by up to 6%. With respect to turnover created in all auctions, the decrease in the number
of closed deals seems to outweigh the increase in bidders’ prices: Turnover would decrease
by up to 2%. For job-categories where non-price characteristics are highly relevant (in our
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sample car repairs), prices would not significantly change but the number of closed deals
would increase. This would increase both buyers’ aggregate welfare (by up to 15%) and
turnover (by up to 13%).
Our work adds to a relatively new strand of literature which analyzes non-binding auc-
tions. From a more general perspective this clearly contributes to the literature which
analyzes efficient ways to procure contracts when the buyer’s valuation of an offer depends
on additional dimensions besides price. Scoring auctions (where binding scoring rules take
price and non-price characteristics into account) have already received significant attention
in the literature are well understood by now. Asker and Cantillon (2008, 2010) show that
for the case when suppliers have multi-dimensional private information, this procurement
mechanism dominates others like sequential bargaining and price-only auctions. Different
scoring auction designs are compared in Che (1993), Branco (1997), Chen-Ritzo et al. (2005)
and Kostamis et al. (2009). Empirical analysis of scoring auctions can be found in Athey and
Levin (2001) and Lewis and Bajari (2011), the first using data from US timber auctions and
the second data from US highway procurement auctions. Practical implementability of scor-
ing auctions through iterative process is analyzed for example in Bichler and Kalagnanam
(2005) or Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005). Finally, in a theoretical contribution Che (1993)
compares scoring auctions with non-binding auctions. He shows that when bidders bid on
all dimensions of their offers, from the buyer’s perspective scoring auctions dominate non-
binding auctions.
Several recent articles compare the performance of non-binding auctions to regular price
only auctions. Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2007) is one of the seminal articles in this context.
They analyze both analytically and experimentally under which conditions the buyer would
want to commit to a price only mechanism which ignores all non-price attributes. As the
authors establish, such commitment is only desirable when competitive pressure is important
(few bidders) and expected quality of the low-cost bidders is not too low (limited negative
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correlation between cost and quality).2 Fugger et al. (2013) find in a recent contribution that
when bidders are uncertain about the exact way different criteria enter the final decision of
the buyer, there are cases where a non-binding auction enables them to coordinate on high
prices. In that case the buyer would prefer binding price-only auctions over non-binding
auctions. In a recent experimental study Brosig-Koch and Heinrich (2014) show that buyers
prefer buyer-determined auctions over price only-auctions.
Wan and Beil (2012) and Wan et al. (2012) analyze related but slightly different problems.
They study auctions where bidders in order to win the auction additionally have to meet
certain quality standards. Those articles explore theoretically and experimentally under
which conditions it is optimal to provide information with respect to the screening among
bidders either prior or after bidding has taken place.
We are especially interested in the effect of different information structures in non-binding
auctions. Several theoretical articles analyze the conditions under which it is beneficial for
the buyer in non-binding auctions to inform bidders about their qualities. Gal-Or et al.
(2007) analyze sealed bid auctions and procurement by sequential search. As they show,
for the latter case the buyer is typically better off when he discloses quality information to
the bidders. Extensions such as the inclusion of risk averse bidders are provided in Doni
and Menicucci (2010). Colucci et al. (2011) extend the setting of Gal-Or et al. (2007) by
introducing heterogeneity in bidders’ costs. They demonstrate that for the case of large cost
differences and a comparatively small weighting of quality aspects it is in the best interest
of the buyer to conceal quality information. In the opposite case, he is better off disclosing
information about the bidders’ qualities.3
2In principle, also our setting compares a non-binding auction (with informed bidders) with a “price-
only”-regime. In our setting, however, “price-only” refers solely to the information held by the bidders, who
know that prices matter, but are uncertain with respect to all other criteria. The buyers always do choose
the ex post best offer, taking into account all non-price characteristics (as in Gal-Or et al., 2007; Doni and
Menicucci, 2010; Haruvy and Katok, 2013). The fundamental insights obtained in our analysis are thus
clearly quite different. As one consequence, for example, the correlation between cost and quality, which
is crucial in Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2007), is not of central importance in our setting since foregone
quality is not an issue.
3For a similar setting Rezende (2009) shows that when the buyer and the suppliers have the possibility
to renegotiate, it can be optimal for the buyer to fully reveal the information about the suppliers’ qualities.
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In a recent article, Haruvy and Katok (2013) are the first ones to shed more light on
those issues from an empirical perspective. Based on controlled laboratory experiments, they
analyze both open and sealed bid non-binding auctions and assess the impact of information
revelation on bids submitted. For the parameter environments chosen in their laboratory
experiments they find that in their open auction design due to more aggressive bidding buyers
are better off if they keep information about bidders’ qualities concealed. Our work differs
from their contribution since our analysis is based on field data of indeed conducted auctions.
Our analysis, moreover, is conducted for several different services to be procured, and thus
allows us to identify under which conditions information revelation indeed is desirable in
open non-binding auctions. That is, for the case of car repairs our results are in line with
those obtained by Haruvy and Katok (2013), whereas for the case of moving and painting
we obtain opposite results.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our theoretical frameworks for
the case of disclosed and that of concealed non-price information and derives under what
conditions a buyer prefers which information regime. Section 3 introduces our dataset. In
section 4, for different auction categories we analyze how buyers value bidders’ non-price
characteristics, and in section 5 we use a reduced-form model to show that bidders’ behavior
is indeed in line with our framework for the case of disclosed non-price information. Based on
these preparations, in section 6 we perform a counterfactual analysis to assess how strongly
buyers’ welfare can be expected to change if non-price information gets concealed from the
bidders. This is done for several auction categories. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
 Framework. We consider a non-binding and open procurement situation where a
buyer wants to procure some contract among J participating firms. Each firm has some
cost cj for providing the service (later on, we will discuss the cases of costs being either
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known or unknown among firms). Bids can be submitted and updated at any point in time
t throughout a given period, t ∈ [0;T ]. That is, firms j = 1, ..., J observe the current bids
of all players and are free to update their bids bj(t) whenever they want to. We denote the
vector of final bids bj(T ) quoted by each firm once bidding has stopped by p = (p1, ..., pJ).
Once price submission has finished the buyer can freely choose to award the contract to some
firm j at price pj.
For the buyer’s decision not only the final price pj quoted by firm j matters but also its
non-price characteristics, which we denote by Aj, and which we assume to be exogenously
given. In analogy to the existing literature on non-binding procurement auctions, we call the
value of these non-price characteristics to the buyer a firm’s quality qj. Given the buyer’s
preferences regarding these non-price characteristics, which we denote by α, we assume that
the quality of firm j is a linear function non-price characteristics and preferences, that is
qj = αAj.
Throughout our analysis, we assume that the buyer is always fully informed about each
firm’s non-price characteristics. However, with respect to the information firms receive about
other firms’ non-price characteristics we differentiate between two cases: In the first case,
which we call information case (IC), each firm is informed about each other firm’s non-price
characteristics and the corresponding preferences of the buyer. That is, in the information
case qualities of all firms are common knowledge. In the other case, which we call no
information case (NIC), the firms are not informed at all about qualities.
We assume that the buyer can choose among J firms and an outside option. He receives
a certain amount of utility uj when he chooses firm j. This amount of utility depends on
the price pj put forward by this firm and the firm’s exogenous non-price characteristics Aj.
We model the utility a buyer receives from a certain firm as being linearly dependent on the
price pj, the firm’s non-price characteristics Aj, and an error term j. With that, we assume
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the buyer’s decision process to be given as
max
j∈{0,1,...,J}
uj, where
u0 = t+ 0
u1 = −p1 + αA1 + 1
... (1)
uJ = −pJ + αAJ + J
α denotes the vector of the buyer’s preferences regarding firms’ non-price characteristics. t
denotes the value of the buyer’s outside option. For simplicity and without loss of generality
we normalize the price coefficient to −1. The error terms j capture unobserved influences on
the buyer’s decision which are unrelated to price or non-price characteristics. When making
his decision, the realizations of the j are known to the buyer, but they always remain
concealed from the firms. The buyer is assumed to choose the option which maximizes his
utility, that is, the option k for which
uk > uj ∀j 6= k, j, k ∈ {1, ..., J}.
 Information case. We assume that in the information case firms have full information
about all firms’ non-price characteristics A and the corresponding preferences of the buyer.
In a non-binding auction, in contrast to a scoring auction, there is no binding and publicly
known scoring rule. That is, firms are not explicitly informed about the way the buyer makes
his decision. Instead, we assume that firms collected information about the buyer’s decision
process (that is, his preferences α regarding their non-price characteristics) by observing
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past auctions. Thus, each firm’s model of the buyer’s decision process is given as
max
j∈{0,1,...,J}
uj, where
u0 = t+ 0
u1 = −p1 + αA1 + 1
... (2)
uJ = −pJ + αAJ + J .
Note that in contrast to the buyer, who knows the realizations of the j when making his
decision, from the firms’ perspectives the j are random. We assume that the unobservables j
follow some distribution, and that the firms know the distribution of the j. In consequence,
given some bid pj of its own, firm j can derive all winning probabilities Pk(p,A), k ∈
{0, 1, ..., J}. These winning probabilities are functions of all firms’ final price bids p =
(p1, ..., pJ) and all firms’ non-price characteristics A = (A1, ...,AJ). We assume that the
winning probability Pk of each firm k is log concave in its final price quote.
4 Expected
profits pij of firm j are given by
pij = Pj(p,A)(pj − cj).
We now proceed and determine an equilibrium based on an appropriately chosen equi-
librium concept for the dynamic bidding game. For the sake of exposition, we first assume
that cost cj for j = 1, . . . , J are known among firms (below we then also discuss the case
of unknown cost of rivals). All firms have the same information, we can thus proceed to
solving the game by simple backwards induction. Since, furthermore, only final bids are
payoff-relevant in our framework, we only need to identify the mutually best responses to
the final price bids of all rivals. We denote the final equilibrium outcome of the dynamic
4Notice that the logit framework referred to from section 6 onwards satisfies this assumption.
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bidding game by p∗. It is characterized by the following expression:
pj +
Pj
∂Pj/∂pj
− cj = 0, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., J}. (3)
The winning probabilities Pj follow from (2) and depend on all bidders’ prices p and non-
price characteristics A. Existence and uniqueness of p∗ as characterized by (3) has already
been shown in the literature, compare Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) and Mizuno (2003).5
 No information case. We assume that in the no information case firms are not
informed about qualities at all.6 Analogous to the information case we assume that there is
no binding and publicly known scoring rule, but that firms instead had to collect information
about the buyer’s decision process from observing past auctions. With non-price information
concealed, in their model of the buyer’s decision process firms can only take into account the
observable prices. That is, we assume the firms’ model of the buyer’s decision process to be:
max
j∈{0,1,...,J}
uj, where
u0 = t˜+ ˜0
u1 = −p1 + ˜1
... (4)
uJ = −pJ + ˜J .
Note that, in contrast to the buyer, firms do not know about the realizations of the ˜j.
Given final price bids p, firm j can derive winning probabilities P˜k, k ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}. These
5For a complete statement of the equilibrium strategy profile we also need to specify bidding behavior
for all instances prior to the end of the auction. There are several possibilities to do so, a natural choice is
to choose b∗j (t) = p
∗
j for all j = 1, . . . , J and for all t < T . Notice that multiple subgame-perfect equilibria
of the dynamic game obtain, all yield the unique equilibrium outcome p∗ specified above, however.
6Remember, the quality of a firm j is a function of that firm’s non-price characteristics and the preferences
of the buyer, that is, qj = αAj . Each bidder clearly knows his own non-price characteristics, he does not
know the preferences of the buyer, however. Hence he knows neither his own nor his rivals’ quality. Our
setup regarding the two extreme information regimes precisely fits the assumptions made in closely related
literature, compare for example Gal-Or et al. (2007).
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winning probabilities are functions of only the firms’ price bids. We assume that the winning
probability P˜k of each firm k is log concave in its final price quote.
7 The expected profit p˜ij
of firm j is given by
p˜ij = P˜j(p) · (pj − cj) . (5)
In analogy to the information case discussed above we now proceed and determine an
equilibrium for the dynamic bidding game. For the sake of exposition, we again first assume
that cost cj for j = 1, . . . , J are known among firms (below we then also discuss the case of
unknown costs of rivals). The unique equilibrium outcome p∗ now is characterized by the
following expression:
pj +
P˜j
∂P˜j/∂pj
− cj = 0, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., J}. (6)
That is, the equilibrium b∗ and the final equilibrium outcome p∗ are obtained analogous to
the information case. However, the winning probabilities as perceived by the bidders, P˜j,
are now determined by (4).
 Robustness of the dynamic equilibrium. As shown above, when costs are known
among firms, the dynamic bidding game can be solved by backwards induction. Initially
submitted bids are irrelevant, and the final best response equilibrium outcome p∗ can be
shown to be unique. As we will argue subsequently, the above characterized outcome p∗ also
obtains in equilibrium when firms are incompletely informed with respect to their rivals’
costs. Thus, we now consider the case where each firm has some private cost cj with distri-
bution Fj(c) with positive and bounded support [c, c] for providing the service. Throughout
the auction bidders j = 1, ..., J can now successively update their beliefs with respect to
rivals’ cost when observing the price-bids b−j(t) submitted by all rivals.
We first consider perfect Bayesian equilibria of the induced dynamic game. Notice that
the final price vector p∗ characterized in expression (3) (respectively (6)) results as an equi-
7Notice that the logit framework referred to from section 6 onwards satisfies this assumption.
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librium outcome. An equilibrium strategy profile supporting this outcome is given as follows:
on the equilibrium path bidders choose the currently (myopically) best response given all
other currently active bids of the rivals (clearly this is also well defined in case no or only few
active bids are already submitted when bidding just started). Beliefs with respect to rivals’
costs are updated consistently, given the observed bids of rivals. The above characterized
final price vector p∗ results from the induced best response dynamic. There is a large class
of beliefs and corresponding bids off the equilibrium path which support the equilibrium
considered.8 Notice, however, that for the case of fully rational bidders also other perfect
Bayesian equilibria of the above specified auction framework involving different equilibrium
outcomes obtain (for example, collusive equilibria).
As shown by Sobel and Wei (2010), furthermore, the restriction to markov perfect equi-
libria allows to restore uniqueness of the equilibrium also under incomplete information, and
in this case p∗ obtains as the unique equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game. Finally,
notice that for the case of myopic bidders which always choose the myopic best response
given the currently active bids of all rivals, the resulting best response dynamic yields the
final price vector p∗ characterized in expressions (3) and (6) as the unique outcome. The
same result also obtains for fully rational bidders which consider all their rivals to behave
myopically (see for example Nisan et al., 2011).9
In sum, we see that for a large class of reasonable assumptions and standard equilibrium
refinement choices the price vector p∗ characterized in expressions (3) and (6) always obtains
as equilibrium outcome of the resulting dynamic bidding game, for many concepts considered
as the unique outcome. We are thus confident that it provides a valuable and convincing
reference for our further analysis.
 Comparing both information regimes. We are interested in whether the buyer
8For example, in case of deviation, players believe all rivals have the lowest possible cost c and choose
their best replies accordingly, without further updating till bidding ends. This yields lower profits than along
the equilibrium, and deviation is thus never profitable.
9Empirical evidence that players indeed significantly underestimate their rivals’ rationality can be found,
for example, in Weizsaecker (2003).
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prefers to disclose or to conceal non-price information. We assume that this decision has to
be made prior to knowing the precise number and identity of the participating firms and
their characteristics. In this case, the buyer prefers the information structure which gives
him the highest expected utility. It is easy to show that there is no information structure
which dominates the other. Appendix A.1 proofs this by example.
The central intuition is that the informational arrangement which creates the highest
competitive pressure among firms is best for the buyer. Which information regime creates
more competitive pressure as perceived by the firms depends on the specific situation con-
sidered, as we show. First, consider a situation where firms have similar production costs
but are quite heterogenous with respect to how the buyer values their non-price charac-
teristics. In short, using the definition of a firm’s quality as the buyer’s valuation of its
non-price characteristics, that means a situation where firms have similar production costs
but very different qualities. A regime which conceals non-price information suggests tough
competition and induces more aggressive bidding. Second, consider a situation where firms
have quite different production costs but quality differences are such as to compensate for
those differences (that is, the more expensive producer also has higher quality). In this case,
full revelation of non-price information induces more aggressive bidding.10 In the following
section we offer an analytical illustration of these tradeoffs.
 Analytical illustration of tradeoffs and model mechanics. To illustrate the
mechanics of our model in closed form we thus make the simplifying assumption that the
difference of the error terms j follows a uniform distribution.
11 We then analyze bidding
10Notice that the fundamental tradeoffs in our setting are different from those occurring when comparing
non-binding auctions with price only-mechanisms, as for example in Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2007).
Desirability in this case is strongly dependent on the correlation between cost and quality, since for the price
only-mechanism considered buyers might be obliged to choose ex post suboptimal offers of low quality. In
our setting buyers always choose the ex post optimal offers once bidding has stopped.
11Standard assumptions in discrete choice settings are that the difference of the error terms follows
a normal or a logit distribution (which in turn follows from the assumptions that the error terms are
normal respectively type I extreme value distributed). However, with these standard assumptions bidders’
winning probabilities Pj either cannot be expressed in closed form or contain exponential terms which lead
to transcendental equations. Thus, for standard assumptions the first order conditions (3) respectively (6)
cannot be solved analytically.
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in an auction where the buyer can choose among two firms only.12 Each firm has non-price
characteristics Aj. The respective preferences of the buyer are denoted by α. The buyer’s
valuation of a firm’s non-price characteristics, that is its quality qj, is given as qj = αAj.
We assume that 2 − 1 shall follow a uniform distribution with mean zero and variance ν
and ˜2 − ˜1 shall follow a uniform distribution with mean zero and variance ν˜.13 As in the
no information case bidders are missing non-price information, they perceive the buyer’s
decision to be more noisy. Thus, we obtain ν˜ ≥ ν. Based on this setup, it is now possible
to derive illustrative analytical results in closed form. The exact derivation can be found in
appendix A.2.
 Relationship between firms’ equilibrium bids. Based on the first order conditions
(3) and (6) we are able to derive the equilibrium bids in closed form (see appendix A.2). We
denote the equilibrium bids in the information case by p∗i , and those in the no information
case by p˜∗i :
p∗1 = p˜
∗
1 −
1
3
(q2 − q1)−
√
3(
√
ν˜ −√ν), (7)
p∗2 = p˜
∗
2 +
1
3
(q2 − q1)−
√
3(
√
ν˜ −√ν). (8)
The intuition behind expressions (7) and (8) is straightforward (without loss of generality
let q1 < q2): The first term added to p˜
∗
2 respectively subtracted from p˜
∗
1 in expressions (7)
and (8) captures that in case of disclosed non-price information firms are aware of firm two’s
competitive advantage in terms of quality: The net competitive pressure on the low-quality
firm (firm one) is higher then in case of concealed non-price information, while that on the
high-quality firm (firm two) is lower. The last term in expressions (7) and (8) captures that
12We furthermore assume that the value of the outside option is so low that the induced upper limit of
the prices of firm 1 and 2 is above the equilibrium prices and the outside option is never chosen. An explicit
consideration of the outside option would make our analysis more complicated without delivering further
insights.
13That is, (2 − 1) ∼ U
[−√3ν,√3ν] and (˜2 − ˜1) ∼ U [−√3ν˜,√3ν˜].
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Figure 1: The preferences of the buyer regarding the information structure as a function of the
auction parameters. The graph shows the indifference line of the buyer. The indifference line represents
the parameter set at which the buyer is indifferent between disclosing and concealing non-price information.
Our parameter assumptions here (c1 = 4.5 and q1 = 0.3) are made with a view to our application. For all
q2-c2-combinations above the indifference line the buyer prefers to conceal non-price information. For all
combinations below he prefers to disclose non-price information.
in case of concealed non-price information firms perceive the buyer’s decision to be more
noisy and thus increase their price bids. That is, the equilibrium offer of the low quality firm
is strictly higher for concealed information (p∗1 > p˜
∗
1), the impact on the equilibrium offer of
the high quality firm is ambiguous, it is lower for large enough quality differential, however.
Thus, concealment of quality information is beneficial for the buyer if and only if this leads
to a reduced equilibrium offer of the high quality firm and additionally the buyer finds it ex
post optimal to then also choose the high quality buyer.
 Relationship between buyer’s expected utilities. The relationship between the
expected utility of the buyer in the information case, EU, and that in the no information
case, E˜U, is given by
EU− E˜U = 1
3
√
12ν
(q2 − q1) [(c2 − c1)− 2(q2 − q1)]
+3(2
√
νν˜ + ν˜ − 3ν) (9)
+(
√
ν˜
2
√
ν
− 1
2
)(c2 + c1 − q2 − q1).
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Equation (9) shows that the net change in the expected utility of the buyer depends on
three factors: The first term captures the tradeoff between the competitive advantage of the
low-cost firm and that of the high-quality firm. If the difference in costs is small but that in
qualities is very high, disclosure of non-price information weakens competition because firms
become aware of the high-quality firm’s large net advantage. If in contrast the difference in
costs is very high and that in qualities small, disclosure of non-price information strengthens
competition as it mitigates the net advantage of the low-cost firm. The second term captures
that in the no information case firms perceive the decision of the buyer to be more noisy.
In the no information case they thus demand higher prices which in turn decreases buyer’s
welfare. The third term weighs the effect of uncertainty (term two) against that of quality
information (term one). The weight of either effect depends on how strong relative to costs
firms’ pricing decisions are influenced by non-price information. The smaller the influence
of non-price information, the more the effect of noise in the buyer’s decision outweighs that
of non-price information.
The graph in figure 1 illustrates how the buyer’s preferences regarding the information
structure change as a function of the auction parameters, namely firms’ costs and qualities.
The parameter sizes used for this example resemble parameter sizes from our application.14
The important take-away is that which information structure to choose for a specific ap-
plication is not clear ex ante but depends on the setting. In general, if the difference in
qualities is high and that in cost is low, the buyer prefers to conceal non-price information.
In contrast, if the difference in qualities is low and that in cost is high, the buyer prefers to
disclose non-price information.
14The average value of αAj in our data (that is, the average quality qj) is 0.3. The average (estimated)
cost are e 450. In “utility-units” this is 4.5 (which equals the average value of ρcj). For our example, we set
c1 = 4.5 and q1 = 0.3.
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3 Data
We have available an extensive dataset from a popular European online procurement
platform. On this platform private customers tender jobs ranging from construction over
general repair and renovation to teaching. Jobs are awarded through an open non-binding
auction.
The exact procedure is as follows: A private customer (the buyer) posts a description of
the job he wants to procure. This description is entered into a free-text field and usually
contains job details (for example, the area to be painted, whether or not cleaning is required,
and so on), the job site, a price expectation (termed “startprice” in the following), and an
announcement of the time span during which tradesmen (the bidders) can put forward
quotes. All this information is available to all tradesmen registered at the platform. During
the defined time span all interested tradesmen can publicly announce prices for which they
are willing to do the offered job. Announced prices can be changed at any point during
the auction. The current price quote of each bidder and all his non-price characteristics
are publicly observable on the website. The non-price characteristics of a bidder include
the number of positive and negative ratings the bidder received so far, his home location,
qualifications like the possession of certain degrees, his area of expertise, and so on. At the
end of the auction the buyer is free to award the job to one of the bidders or to withdraw
his offer. In case of an award the platform obtains a certain percentage of the successful bid
as commission.
We have available data on auctions which were conducted during the years 2007 and
2008. In this time span the auction platform experimented with some rule changes. In order
to exclude the possibility that our results are influenced by these rule changes we focus our
analysis on auctions which took place during the second half of the year 2008. In this period
there were only minor rule changes, like for example a slight reduction of the time span after
which the buyer has to decide whether to withdraw his offer or award the job to one of the
participating bidders. Minor changes like these should have no effect on our results.
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Figure 2: Distribution of auctions over startprice categories. Displayed is the distribution of all
auctions which were conducted in the three largest job-categories (“moving”, “painting” and “car”) during
the second half of 2008 over all startprice-categories. Startprice-category 1 ranges from e 1-100, startprice-
category 2 ranges from e 101-200, and so on.
The auctions we observe in the second half of 2008 are grouped into 32 job-categories. The
three most frequent job-categories are “moving” (14.1% of all auctions), “painting” (8.4% of
all auctions) and “car repairs” (7.0% of all auctions). We concentrate our following analysis
on these three job-categories. Besides by the kind of job offered, auctions are differentiated by
the value of the jobs offered. We use the price expectation the buyer states at the beginning
of the auction (the startprice) as a proxy for the value of the job offered.15 Startprices can be
chosen freely but are typically set in multiples of e 100 (respectively e 50 for auctions with
values below e 500). We sort the auctions into different startprice-categories: Category 1
ranges from e 1-100, category 2 from e 101-200, and so on. Figure 2 depicts the distribution
of the auctions over these startprice-categories for the three most frequent auction categories.
The numbers show that 38% of all auctions have startprices between e 1-100, and of these
15The level of the startprices put forward by the buyers is highly correlated with the level of the prices
the bidders put forward, which reassures us that startprices are indeed good proxies for the value of the jobs
procured. Note also that the startprice is set purely for informational reasons, it neither puts any restriction
on bids submitted nor on the award decision made by the potential buyer.
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“Moving” Mean SD Median Min Max
Nbr. of auctions 16,841
Nbr. of bidders 4,564
Nbr. of buyers 15,076
Nbr. of bidders per auction 5.1 3.1 4 2 27
Bid amount 556.7 463.7 450 1 3000
Nbr. of auction participations per bidder 5.3 35.8 1 1 1748
Auctions per buyer 1.1 0.5 1 1 23
Auction duration (days) 10.6 9.6 8.7 0 144.0
Last bid placement (hours till auction end) 88.5 160.8 20.0 0 1,883.7
“Painting” Mean SD Median Min Max
Nbr. of auctions 11,434
Nbr. of bidders 5,800
Nbr. of buyers 10,614
Nbr. of bidders per auction 6.4 4.2 5 2 31
Bid amount 606.2 496.3 450 0 3000
Nbr. of auction participations per bidder 5.2 21.9 1 1 793
Auctions per buyer 1.1 0.3 1 1 8
Auction duration (days) 11.4 9.3 10 0 120.0
Last bid placement (hours till auction end) 84.2 162.4 12.3 0 1,891.8
“Car” Mean SD Median Min Max
Nbr. of auctions 3,413
Nbr. of bidders 1,541
Nbr. of buyers 3,216
Nbr. of bidders per auction 2.8 1.2 2 2 12
Bid amount 398.0 449.4 250 1 3000
Nbr. of auction participations per bidder 2.7 12.4 1 1 397
Auctions per buyer 1.1 0.3 1 1 4
Auction duration (days) 15.3 12.1 14 0 118.1
Last bid placement (hours till auction end) 150.8 215.5 53.2 0 1,786.7
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for auctions from job categories “moving”, “painting”, and “car”.
The table displays descriptive statistics for auctions from the three most popular job categories (“moving”,
“painting”, and “car”). Considered are all auctions with startprices ranging from e 1-2000 and with at least
two participating bidders.
auctions again 60% have a startprice of e 50 or less. We expect bidding behavior in these
very low valued auctions to be fundamentally different from bidding behavior in auctions
with higher stakes and thus drop all auctions with startprices less or equal to e 100 from
our analysis.
For every auction in each job-startprice-category we have available information about the
number and the identities of the participating bidders, the prices put forward, the bidders’
non-price characteristics (like the number of positive and negative ratings, the possession
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Figure 3: Spatial distribution of auctions and exemplary bidding process. On the left, the spatial
distribution of auctions in Germany is displayed. On the right, an example of a typical bidding process is
shown. The different symbols stand for different bidders, the auction is from the job category “painting”,
and the startprice set was e 200.
of certain degrees and qualifications, and so on) and the final choice of the potential buyer
(including whether he chose to withdraw his job offer). We use only auctions in which at
least two bidders participate. Descriptive statistics for each auction-category are given in
table 1. The left part of figure 3 shows the spatial distribution of all auctions conducted,
the right part gives an exemplary impression of the course of an auction.
On the auction platform we have our data from both buyers and bidders are fully informed
about each bidders’ non-price characteristics. We are interested in what would happen to
the welfare of the buyers if this non-price information was concealed from the bidders. Our
theoretical considerations in section 2 show that, among other things, the answer depends
on how important bidders’ non-price characteristics are to buyers. We think it is reasonable
to expect buyers’ preferences α regarding bidders’ non-price characteristics to depend both
on the job category and on the value of the job offered. For example, whether a bidder has
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undergone professional training should matter more for jobs from the “car repairs” category
than for jobs from the “moving” category. Similarly, whether a bidder has liability insurance
might matter more for a buyer when he procures a high-value job than when he procures
a low-value job. To capture that the choice behavior of a buyer (and in consequence the
behavior of the bidders) possibly depends on the type and the value of the job offered, we will
perform separate analyses for the three most frequent job categories (“moving”, “painting”,
“car repairs”) and for each of the three most frequent startprice-categories (2, 3 and 5).16
For a sample of around two-thousand auctions from job category “painting” we manually
extracted information about cost factors from the job descriptions. These cost factors include
for example the area to be painted, whether paint is provided by the buyer, and so on. We
do not need this information for our counterfactual analysis in section 6, where for each
job-startprice-category we analyze the change in aggregate welfare of the buyers in case
non-price information gets concealed. However, before doing our counterfactual analysis in
section 6, in section 5 we use information about these cost factors to verify a fundamental
assumption of our counterfactual analysis: That bidders know about the preferences of the
buyers regarding their non-price characteristics and that thus our model for the case of
disclosed non-price information describes their behavior.
4 Analysis of Buyers’ Preferences
Besides price information buyers have available information about the non-price char-
acteristics of the bidders. We assume that when making their decisions buyers take into
account both price and non-price information. In particular, we assume that a buyer’s rank-
ing of a given bidder depends on both the price that bidder puts forward and how he values
that bidder’s non-price characteristics. With Aj denoting the vector of bidder j’s non-price
characteristics and α denoting the vector of the buyer’s respective preferences, we assume
16For the sake of completeness the results for startprice-category 4 are given in tables 8 and 9 in the
appendix.
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the buyer’s valuation of bidder j’s non-price characteristics (that is, bidder j’s quality) to
be equal to αAj. We observe each bidder’s non-price characteristics, but we do not observe
the preferences of the buyers. In this section we use a logit discrete choice model to elicit
buyers’ preferences α.
 Econometric model. For a given auction n we model a buyer’s decision as a discrete
choice among all participating bidders and an outside option. We assume the buyer to
base his decision among bidders on both their prices and their non-price characteristics.
Bidders’ non-price characteristics comprise binary characteristics, indicating for example the
possession of certain degrees, discrete characteristics, like the number of positive and negative
ratings, and a continuous measure for the distance between a bidder’s home location and
the job site.17
We estimate buyers’ preferences along the lines of the model we developed in section
2: In a given auction n, a buyer’s utility from choosing bidder j is assumed to be linearly
dependent on the bidder’s price pnj, how he values the bidder’s non-price characteristics, and
an error term nj. We assume that the buyer’s valuation of a bidder’s non-price characteristics
is a linear function of that bidder’s non-price characteristics and the buyer’s respective
preferences, that is αAnj.
18 With ρ denoting the price elasticity of the buyer in auction n,19
the utility he derives from each of the Jn participating bidders can explicitly be formulated
17The distance measure is constructed from the buyers’ and the bidders’ zip-codes.
18For simplicity, we are assuming that each buyer has the same preferences α. We could replace this
assumption by assuming that the preferences α of the buyers follow a normal distribution, and accordingly
estimate a mixed logit model. However, this more involved approach does not deliver significantly different
results.
19We use a logit discrete choice model to elicit the preferences of the buyers. The scale of the logit discrete
choice model is determined by the variance of the error terms j . Thus, for our empirical analysis we can no
longer use the convenient normalization of the price coefficient ρ to -1.
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as
un0 = n0
un1 = t+ ρpn1 + αAn1 + n1
... (10)
unJn = t+ ρpnJn + αAnJn + nJn .
The constant t captures the value of the outside option. It holds that the lower t the higher
is the value of the outside option. The error terms nj capture unobserved influences on the
buyer’s decision unrelated to bidders’ prices or their observed non-price characteristics. The
buyer is assumed to choose the bidder which offers him the highest utility. By assuming the
error terms nj to be independently, identically type I extreme value distributed we obtain
the standard logit model: The choice probabilities are given as
Pnj =

1
1+
∑Jn
k=1 e
t+ρpnk+αAnk
if j = 0,
et+ρpnj+αAnj
1+
∑Jn
k=1 e
t+ρpnk+αAnk
if j ∈ {1, ..., Jn}.
Estimates of the model parameters {ρ,α} can be obtained by maximizing the likelihood
L =
N∏
n=1
Jn∏
j=0
(Pnj)
ynj , ynj =

1 if alternative j is chosen in auction n,
0 otherwise.
 Estimation results. We estimate our model for each combination of the job cat-
egories “moving”, “painting”, “car repairs” and the startprice-categories 2, 3, 5. Table 2
displays the results for startprice category 2 (which covers all auctions with startprices rang-
ing from e 101-200) and all job categories. Table 3 displays the results for job category
“moving” and all startprice-categories. The results for all other job-startprice-categories
considered are similar and due to reasons of brevity not displayed here.
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Job category
Covariates in
buyer’s utility fct. “Moving” “Painting” “Car”
Bid amount (e 100) -1.467∗∗∗ -1.552∗∗∗ -1.426∗∗∗
Nbr. of positive ratings (ln) 0.211∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
Nbr. of negative ratings (ln) -0.171∗∗∗ -0.240∗∗∗ -0.386∗∗∗
Nbr. of employees -0.0436 -0.0832 -0.119
Liability insurance 0.303∗ 0.163 -0.0436
Distance (km, ln) -0.132∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.0540
Certified membership 0.0113 0.0216 0.0142
Trade License -0.0256 -0.0480 -0.0147
Master craftsman company -0.182 -0.0000365 0.0323
Engineer 0.0000382 -0.0804 0.437
Technician 1.337∗ 1.287∗ 0.118
Senior journeyman company 0.151 -0.194 -0.298
Other certifications -0.274∗∗∗ 0.142 -0.143
Craftsman card -0.646∗ -0.0834 0.0690
Certified registrations 0.140 -0.0993 0.396
In craftsmen register 0.0529 0.0492 -0.140
Constant 1.759∗∗∗ 2.051∗∗∗ 1.778∗∗∗
Nbr. of observations 14106 10849 1896
Nbr. of auctions 2691 1703 474
Table 2: Preference estimates for startprice-category 2 and all job-categories. The table gives the
results of the estimation of the logit discrete choice model given by equation (10) for startprice-category 2
and all job-categories. Displayed are the coefficients on the covariates in the utility function of the buyers.
Significance niveaus are reported by stars: ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%.
The estimates for all job-startprice-categories exhibit the same general pattern: The coef-
ficients on the price coefficient, the ratings coefficients and the constant are highly significant,
while the coefficients on the other covariates are mostly insignificant. That does not come
as a surprise, as the information about bidders most prominently displayed in the auction
overview screen are bidders’ prices and the number of their positive and negative ratings.
Information on bidders’ other non-price characteristics like the possession of certain degrees
or the membership in certain institutions is only available after some additional clicks. The
constant is highly significant because in about half of all auctions buyers choose to withdraw
their job offers. It holds that the higher the value of the constant (which appears in the
utility a buyer derives from a certain bidder), the lower is the value of the outside option.
The numbers given in tables 2 and 3 are coefficient estimates and as such have no direct
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Startprices
Covariates in
buyer’s utility fct. e 101-200 e 201-300 e 401-500
Bid amount (e 100) -1.467∗∗∗ -1.148∗∗∗ -0.585∗∗∗
Nbr. of positive ratings (ln) 0.211∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
Nbr. of negative ratings (ln) -0.171∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗
Nbr. of employees -0.0436 -0.0757 -0.0150
Liability insurance 0.303∗ 0.395∗ 0.657∗
Distance (km, ln) -0.132∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗
Certified membership 0.0113 0.115 0.0226
Trade License -0.0256 0.0271 0.0517
Master craftsman company -0.182 -0.307 -0.843∗∗∗
Engineer 0.0000382 0.0226 0.00795
Technician 1.337∗ 0.645 1.701∗∗∗
Senior journeyman company 0.151 0.0530 -0.383
Other certifications -0.274∗∗∗ 0.0553 0.180∗∗
Craftsman card -0.646∗ 0.0461 0.325
Certified registrations 0.140 -0.280 0.381
In craftsmen register 0.0529 -0.158 -0.226
Constant 1.759∗∗∗ 2.122∗∗∗ 1.022∗∗
Nbr. of observations 14106 10911 10908
Nbr. of auctions 2691 1813 1517
Table 3: Preference estimates for job-category “moving” and all startprice-categories. The table
gives the results of the estimation of the logit discrete choice model given by (10) for job-category “moving”
and all startprice-categories. Displayed are the coefficients on the covariates in the utility function of the
buyers. Significance niveaus are reported by stars: ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%.
interpretation. In order to get an impression of the effect of a decrease of a bidder’s price
by e 10 or an increase in his positive or negative ratings, we computed average marginal
effects. For startprice-category 2 (table 2), we find that a decrease of a bidder’s price by
e 10 increases his winning probability by around 2%. This holds for all job-categories. Over
all job-categories, one additional positive rating increases a bidder’s winning probability by
around 1%, while an additional negative rating decreases a bidder’s winning probability by
around 2%. The influence of the number of ratings is most pronounced for category “car
repairs” , where one additional negative rating lowers a bidder’s winning probability by
around 4%.
For job-category “moving” (table 3), with respect to ratings we get the result that for all
startprice-categories an additional positive rating increases a bidder’s winning probability
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by around 1%, while an additional negative rating decreases a bidder’s winning probability
by around 2%. As might be expected, we find that the effect of a decrease in a bidder’s
price depends on the value of the auction (as is proxied for by the startprice) - the higher
the value of the auction, the lower the effect of a certain price decrease. In particular, we
find that while a price decrease of e 10 increases a bidder’s winning probability by 2% for
startprice-category 2, it only increases a bidder’s winning probability by less than 1% for
startprice category 5.
We think it is reasonable to assume that on average jobs from categories “moving” and
“painting” require less skills than jobs from the category “car repair”. That is, for the latter
category we expect bidders non-price characteristics to be more important for the decisions
of the buyers. This presumption is confirmed by our results - a look at table 2 shows that the
influence of a bidder’s ratings relative to his price (as expressed by the relationship between
the coefficient on a bidder’s positive respectively negative ratings and the price coefficient)
is indeed significantly higher for category “car repairs” than for categories “moving” and
“painting”.
The results discussed above hinge on the assumption that the error terms nj in (10) are
neither correlated with the prices pnj nor with bidders’ attributes Anj. In other words, for
our estimation results to be consistent there must be no unobserved factors which influence
buyers’ utilities in a way systematically connected to our observables. However, as we analyze
auctions conducted on an online marketplace, and as we were provided with very detailed
recordings of these auctions, we are convinced that we are able to control for all factors
which have a systematic influence on the buyers’ utilities: Our data contains exactly the
amount of information about bidders buyers have available when making their decisions.
Thus, there should be no influences on buyers’ utilities which are both unobserved and in
some way systematically connected to bidders’ attributes.
27
5 Analysis of Bidders’ Information State
In section 2 we proposed two models to describe bidders’ behavior in open non-binding
auctions. On the auction platform we have our data from bidders are informed about each
other’s non-price characteristics. We would thus expect their behavior to be in line with the
predictions of our information case model. To verify this hypothesis, in this section we use
a reduced form model to verify whether the observed behavior of the bidders is indeed in
line with the predictions of our information case model. In particular, we exploit contrasting
testable predictions of the framework for the case of disclosed and that of concealed non-price
information: If bidders behave according to our information case model, they should react to
changes in the quality composition of an auction. In particular, in reaction to the appearance
of a high quality opponent they should strongly decrease their prices. In contrast, if bidders
behave according to our no information case model, they should show no reaction at all.
 Econometric model. We test for these contrasting implications by using the follow-
ing reduced form model of bidders’ pricing behavior:
pnj = ξKnj + βSnj + aj + νnj. (11)
This model describes bidders’ pricing behavior along the lines of our theoretical frameworks
from section 2. Basically, we assume that the price bidder j puts forward in auction n
depends on his cost cnj and, in case of disclosed quality information, on his quality relative
to that of his rivals. We assume the cost cnj to depend both on observable cost factors Knj
and on unobserved opportunity costs of bidder j. How bidder j fares in terms of the buyer’s
valuation of his non-price characteristics (that is, in terms of quality) relative to his rivals is
assumed to depend on bidder j’s strength in terms of quality relative to the whole population
of bidders and an unobserved auction-specific deviation. Bidder j’s overall strength in terms
of quality is captured in the bidder specific constant aj. The error term νnj captures both
bidder j’s opportunity costs for the job offered in auction n and the auction-specific deviation
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to this “overall strength”.
The binary variable Snj indicates whether bidder j faces a rival bidder who is strong in
terms of quality. We know from our theoretical considerations that if in case of disclosed
quality information a rival of bidder j was replaced by one who is stronger in terms of
quality, bidder j should react by decreasing his price. In contrast, if quality information was
concealed, bidder j should show no reaction. That means we expect β < 0 if bidders behave
according to our information case model, and β = 0 otherwise.
 Identification strategy. We restrict our analysis to bidders which are observed to
participate in several auctions. In doing so, we are able to estimate equation (11) by mean-
differencing (that is, employing a fixed effects estimator). By that we get rid of the individual
specific and unobserved constants aj. The assumption which has to hold for our estimates
to be consistent is that the nj are mean-independent from the observable cost elements Knj
and the strong rival indicator Snj. As we will discuss in more detail below, this assumption
is likely to hold in our case.
 Estimation. Our results from section 4 show that throughout all job-startprice
categories the decisions of the buyers are strongly influenced by the number of positive and
negative ratings of bidders. Thus, we define that a given bidder j encounters a strong rival
in auction n if at least one of the other bidders in auction n has a difference of positive and
negative ratings of at least 90:20
Snj =

1 if encounter with strong bidder (ratings difference ≥ 90),
0 otherwise.
In order to estimate equation (11) we need information about cost factors Knj. Thus, we
have to restrict our estimation to the subset of auctions from job category “painting” for
which we manually collected cost information. In order to estimate equation (11) by a fixed
20For comparison: The mean difference of positive and negative ratings in our sample is 5.8. 1% of the
bidders in our sample have a ratings difference of at least 90.
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Dependent variable:
Bid amount of bidder j
in auction n (1) (2) (3)
Encounter with -82.85∗∗∗ -91.57∗∗∗ -93.79∗∗∗
strong rival (dummy) (14.89) (17.73) (17.77)
Controls:
Area to paint (m2) 1.72∗∗∗ 1.74∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗
Area to paper (m2) 1.41∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗
Paper removal (m2) 2.72∗∗∗ 2.89∗∗∗ 2.54∗∗∗
Cleaning (dummy) 77.63∗∗∗ 64.08∗∗ 54.01∗
Reparation (dummy) 40.60∗∗∗ 56.39∗∗∗ 42.30∗∗∗
Priming (dummy) 124.60∗∗∗ 125.44∗∗∗ 114.41∗∗∗
No. of windows 10.41 11.00 13.39
No. of window frames 34.31 25.40 19.41
No. of doors 45.78∗∗∗ 46.23∗∗∗ 42.22∗∗∗
No. of door frames 17.72∗∗∗ 18.56∗∗∗ 18.21∗∗∗
Nbr. of radiators 85.33∗∗∗ 85.58∗∗∗ 78.91∗∗∗
Paint by contractor (dummy) 25.99∗∗ 14.97 18.89∗
Varnish by contractor (dummy) 125.58∗ 116.82 102.01
Distance (km) 1.15∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ .76∗∗∗
Dummies for nbr. of bidders X X
Dummies for region X X
Controls for bidder composition X
Bidder FE’s X X X
R2 0.292 0.300 0.341
N 9,546 9,546 9,546
Table 4: Identification of bidders’ reaction to a strong rival. The table shows the results of a fixed
effects estimation of the reduced-form model (11). The dependent variable is bid amount. Covariates are
a dummy indicating the appearance of strong rival (a rival with a difference between positive and negative
ratings of at least 90) and cost controls. The panel consists of 941 bidders who on average took part in 10
auctions each. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. For all results: both within- and
between-R2 are close to the overall R2. Significance niveaus are reported by stars: ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%.
effects estimator we have to restrict our sample to bidders which are observed in at least two
auctions. This leaves us with a sample of 941 bidders, taking part in 1,498 auctions from job
category “painting” (the mean number of auction participations is 10, the median number
is 6). In 22.2% of these auctions a bidder with a ratings difference of at least 90 takes part.
Table 4 shows our estimation results. The first column displays our base specification.
In column two we add dummies to control for auction size and for regional influences.21 The
21We define auctions to be from the same region when the first digit of their zip code is identical.
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coefficients on the cost factors do not vary much between the specifications, and they are of
reasonable size: A professional tradesman in Germany charges on average e 5-6 per painted
square meter. This includes painting, paint, cleaning and travel. The average area to be
painted in the subset of auctions for which we have cost information available is 138.3 m2,
the average travel distance 45.0 km (one-way). Together with our estimation results in table
4, this implies that the average price per square meter painted, including paint and travel,
is about e 3-4. Given that most of the bidders on the platform are non-professionals,22
this number seems to be plausible. In both specifications the coefficient on the strong rival
indicator Snj is highly significant and strongly negative, meaning that bidders bid more
competitive if they encounter a strong rival: they lower their bids by around e 90, which is
a quite strong reduction given that the average bid amount in our sample is around e 550.
 Discussion of estimation results. Our estimation results show that bidders react
to the appearance of a strong rival by lowering their bids. This verifies our assumption that
bidders behave according to our information case model. However, as mentioned during the
derivation of equation (11) above, the coefficient at the strong rival indicator Snj, β, can
only be interpreted as the direct causal effect of the appearance of a strong rival on bidder
j’s bidding behavior if the unobserved part of equation (11), νnj, is mean independent from
the observables Knj and Snj. In the following we shortly discuss why we are confident that
mean independence holds.
νnj captures two unobserved influences on bidder j’s bid: One stems from the composition
of auction n in terms of the qualities of bidder j’s rivals, the other stems from bidder j’s
cost components. Thus, we have to ensure that our results are not biased by selection
effects or the systematic omission of unobserved cost factors. With regard to selection
effects, it might be that either strong bidders select themselves into certain auctions, or that
certain types of bidders select themselves into auctions where a strong bidder is present. In
effect, that would lead to a correlation between the appearance of a strong bidder and the
2278% of the bidders in our sample are neither master craftsmen nor senior journeymen.
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composition of an auction in terms of bidders’ qualities. To be sure that we actually capture
the bidder’s reaction to the appearance of a strong rival, in column 3 of table 4 we control
for auction composition. We do so by taking the averages over the attributes of all “weak”
bidders (bidders with a difference of positive and negative ratings of less than 90), and using
these averages as further controls in our fixed effects regression. Controlling for the auction
composition does not change our results.
Omission of unobserved cost factors is only problematic if these factors are systematically
connected to the appearance of a strong rival. However, we do not think that the appearance
of a strong rival is correlated with unobserved cost factors for two reasons: First, we collected
our data by extracting cost information from the job offers as they were available to the
bidders. It is quite unlikely that we systematically missed a factor which is observable to
the bidders and which indicates a deviation in cost. Second, even if we missed a factor of
this kind, it should be known to the buyers. Before an auction starts, the buyers announce
a startprice. This startprice is announced for informational purposes, and it should be
reasonable to assume that, when setting the startprices, besides at strategic considerations
buyers orientate themselves at the costs of the job they offer. So, if there is a cost factor
which is unobserved by us as researchers but known to the buyers and bidders, this cost
factor should be reflected in the level of the startprice. Auctions in which a strong rival
appears actually do systematically differ from auctions in which there is no strong rival in
terms of the startprice. However, auctions in which a strong rival appears do not have a lower
but a higher startprice, indicating that strong rivals select themselves into auctions which
seem to be quite valuable relative to the observable cost elements. This kind of selection
should work against the hypothetical effect of the appearance of a strong rival in the case of
informed bidders. As we are still able to observe more competitive bidding when a strong
rival appears, we are quite certain that the coefficient on Snj identifies strategic bidding
behavior.
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6 Counterfactual Analysis
In this section we determine the impact of availability of quality information on the
aggregate welfare of the buyers. In our data, information about bidders’ non-price char-
acteristics is publicly available, and bidders can infer information about the preferences of
the buyers regarding their non-price characteristics from observing buyers’ former decisions.
Thus, bidders’ behavior should be in line with the information case model we developed in
section 2. In section 5 we verified this assumption.
We are interested in how buyers’ welfare would change in case non-price information
was concealed from the bidders. That is, we are interested in a counterfactual scenario
where bidders are informed about each other’s prices but not about each other’s non-price
characteristics. The buyers on the other hand shall always be informed about all bidders’
prices and non-price characteristics.
In order to calculate the change in buyers’ welfare if quality information was concealed,
we need information about bidders’ counterfactual prices. With information about bidders’
cost cnj we could calculate these counterfactual prices by employing our no information case
model. From our data we do not have explicit cost information,23 but as observed bidders’
behavior is in line with our model for the case of disclosed quality information, we can use
this model to derive estimates of each bidders’ cost cnj from the observed prices pnj.
Our counterfactual analysis proceeds as follows: In our data we have information about
bidders’ prices and bidders’ non-price characteristics. We use this information together with
the information on buyers’ preferences from section 4 to solve our information case model (3)
after estimates of bidders’ costs cˆnj. We then use these cost estimates as input and solve our
no information case model (6) after estimates of bidders’ counterfactual prices pˆnj. Finally,
we use our estimates of bidders’ counterfactual prices pˆnj to compute how buyers’ welfare
would change in case non-price information was concealed from the bidders. Figure 4 depicts
23Note that it is possible to extract information about common cost factors in auction n from the job
description (as we manually did for some auctions from category painting). However, for our counterfactual
analysis we need information on the specific cost cnj bidder j incurs in auction n.
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Information case model
pnj +
Pnj
∂Pnj/∂pnj
− cnj = 0,
Pnj = Pnj(pn,An; tˆ, ρˆ, αˆ)
Cost estimates
cˆ
Preference estimates
tˆ, ρˆ, αˆ
Logit model,
full
unj = t− ρpnj +αAnj + nj
No information case model
pˆnj +
P˜nj
∂P˜nj/∂pˆnj
− cˆnj = 0,
P˜nj = P˜nj(pˆn; t˜, ρ˜)
Preference estimates
t˜, ρ˜
Logit model,
prices only
unj = t˜ − ρ˜pnj + ˜nj
Counterfactual
price estimates
pˆ
Figure 4: Sketch of the course of the counterfactual analysis.
the course of our counterfactual analysis schematically.
 Estimation of bidders’ cost. Our assumption that bidders’ behavior can be de-
scribed by our model for the information case implies that the observed bids pnj are equilib-
rium bids which for every auction n solve the bidders’ first order conditions
pnj +
Pnj
∂Pnj/∂pnj
− cnj = 0, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., Jn}. (12)
Besides on bid amounts pnj and bidders non-price characteristics Anj, which we observe in
our data, the winning probabilities Pnj depend on the preferences {ρ,α} of the buyer. By
inserting our estimates {ρˆ, αˆ} from section 4, we directly arrive at estimates Pˆnj for the
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Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
Moving Painting
Actual bidamounts (pnj) e 206.56 e 80.86 e 195 e 219.38 e 80.09 e 200
Estimated costs (cˆnj) e 134.41 e 86.52 e 120.85 e 155.53 e 84.76 e 136.21
(e 3.62) (e 3.30)
Counterfactual e 208.69 e 80.27 e 195.59 e 224.81 e 79.82 e 205.07
bidamounts (pˆnj) (e 1.86) (e 1.44)
Car
Actual bidamounts (pnj) e 186.31 e 69.27 e 180
Estimated costs (cˆnj) e 107.26 e 74.49 e 97.10
(e 9.02)
Counterfactual e 187.72 e 67.85 e 177.70
bidamounts (pˆnj) (e 2.55)
Table 5: Estimated costs and counterfactual bidamounts for startprice-category 2 and all job-
categories. Displayed are summary statistics for actual bidamounts, estimated costs and estimated coun-
terfactual bidamounts for all three job categories and for startprice-category 2 (which includes startprices
from e 101-200). The results are based on 2,418 auctions for job category “moving”, on 1,509 auctions for
job category “painting”, and on 700 auctions for job category “car”. Bootstrapped standard errors are given
in parentheses.
winning probabilities:
Pˆnj =

1
1+
∑Jn
k=1 e
t+ρˆpnk+αˆAnk
if j = 0,
et+ρˆpnj+αˆAnj
1+
∑Jn
k=1 e
t+ρˆpnk+αˆAnk
if j ∈ {1, ..., Jn}.
(13)
With these, the first order conditions (12) can be solved for estimates ĉnj of bidders’ costs
cnj.
Table 5 displays summary statistics of our cost estimates for startprice-category 2 and all
three job-categories. To account for the fact that our cost estimates are based on estimates
of the buyers’ preferences, we computed bootstrapped standard errors. The standard error
of the mean of our cost estimates ranges from e 4-9. Thus, the estimates of bidders’ costs are
quite precise. The cost estimates become more meaningful if we look at the markup bidders
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Figure 5: Distribution of bidders’ markups. Displayed is the density distribution of bidders’ markups
on their (estimated) costs for all three job categories and startprice-category 2 (which includes startprices
from e 101-200).
demand on their costs. Figure 5 displays the estimated distribution of bidders’ markups on
their costs for startprice-category 2 and all three job-categories.24 The median markup in
the “painting” category is 46%, in the “moving” category it is 59%, and in the “car repairs”
category it is 77%.
Now, are these markups of a sensible order of magnitude? From the cost information
we manually collected for a part of the auctions from category “painting” we know that for
auctions from startprice-category 2 the average area to paint equals around 80 m2. In more
illustrative terms, that for example could mean painting the walls and the ceilings of two
24Due to the sensitivity of our cost estimation to extreme bidamounts, for up to 5% of the bidders we
get cost estimates close to zero and thus in turn quite high markups. For the sake of illustration these are
omitted in figure 5.
36
small rooms of around 16 m2 floor space each. We assume that, depending on the level of
practice, a job like this could be done by one person in around six hours. Startprice-category
2 includes auctions with startprices ranging from e 101-200, and the level of bidders’ prices
is highly correlated with the level of the startprice. (Most of the auctions in this category
have a startprice of e 200.) Given a markup of 46%, this roughly amounts to an hourly
profit of around e 10, which seems to be sensible.
 Counterfactual Simulation. Our counterfactual assumption is that non-price infor-
mation is concealed from the bidders. In this case, the bidders’ model of the buyers’ decision
process in a given auction n is
max
j∈{0,1,...,Jn}
unj, where
un0 = ˜n0, (14)
unj = t˜− ρ˜pnj + ˜nj for j ∈ {1, ..., Jn}. (15)
Like in the information case, also in the no information case we assume that bidders gather
information about the buyers’ decision process by observing past auctions. We can put
ourselves in the bidders’ position in the counterfactual no information case by ignoring the
non-price information available to us as econometricians and estimating choice model (15)
only using price information. With our estimates t˜ and ρ˜ we can then formulate the bidders’
first order conditions in the no information case as
pˆnj +
P˜nj
∂P˜nj/∂pˆnj
− cˆnj = 0, j ∈ {1, ..., Jn}, (16)
where
P˜nj =
et˜+ρ˜pˆnj
1 +
∑Jn
k=1 e
t˜+ρ˜pˆnk
. (17)
We solve conditions (16) numerically for estimates pˆnj of bidders’ equilibrium prices in the
no information case.
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With estimates pˆnj of the counterfactual bids we can calculate the counterfactual ag-
gregate utility of the buyers: Following Small and Rosen (1981), for type I extreme value
distributed error terms j the change in expected utility of the buyer in an auction n can be
calculated as
∆EUn = EUn − E˜Un = ln
(
1 +
Jn∑
j=1
etˆ+ρˆpnj+αˆAnj
)
− ln
(
1 +
Jn∑
j=1
etˆ+ρˆpˆnj+αˆAnj
)
.
The change in buyers’ aggregate utility if quality information was concealed is then simply
given as
∆EUtotal =
N∑
n=1
∆EUn (18)
Division by ρˆ delivers the monetary equivalents of the changes in utility.
 Results. For each job-startprice category considered, we derive counterfactual es-
timates of prices, probabilities of unclosed deals, the aggregate welfare of the buyers, and
the turnover created in all auctions in this job-startprice category. Tables 6 and 7 report
our results.25 All our counterfactual results are based on estimates of the preferences of
the buyers. To account for errors in these first step estimations we computed bootstrapped
standard errors.
Table 6 shows that in case non-price information gets concealed we expect bidders’ prices
to increase significantly in categories “painting” and “moving”. These results are in line with
intuition: In categories “painting” and “moving”, buyers’ decisions are mainly influenced by
bidders’ prices and not so much their qualities (see table 2). In case information about
bidders’ quality gets concealed, the advantage of low-cost bidders is no longer mitigated
by quality information (the assumption here is that low quality correlates with low costs).
Thus, competitive pressure decreases and prices increase. In category “car repairs”, where
quality information strongly influences buyers’ decisions (see table 2), prices do not change
25A more detailed overview of all our results is given in tables 8 and 9 in the appendix.
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Changes in mean bidamount:
Startprice- Job-category
category Moving Painting Car
2 1.0% ∗∗∗ 2.5% ∗∗∗ 0.8%
(e 101-200) (0.4%, 2,418 auct.) (0.4%, 1,509 auct.) (1.0%, 700 auct.)
3 1.5% ∗∗∗ 3.0% ∗∗∗ 0.5%
(e 201-300) (0.3%, 1,692 auct.) (0.5%, 1,578 auct.) (1.4%, 480 auct.)
5 2.7% ∗∗∗ 5.2% ∗∗∗ 0.9%
(e 401-500) (0.5%, 1,446 auct.) (0.8%, 1,312 auct.) (7.3%, 229 auct.)
Changes in probability of an unclosed deal:
Startprice- Job-category
category Moving Painting Car
2 0.3% 3.9% ∗∗ -0.6%
(e 101-200) (1.0%, 2,418 auct.) (1.6%, 1,509 auct.) (3.6%, 700 auct.)
3 1.6% ∗ 5.8% ∗∗∗ -10.9% ∗∗
(e 201-300) (0.9%, 1,692 auct.) (1.4%, 1,578 auct.) (4.5%, 480 auct.)
5 4.2% ∗∗∗ 7.3% ∗∗∗ 1.4%
(e 401-500) (1.4%, 1,446 auct.) (1.7%, 1,312 auct.) (9.8%, 229 auct.)
Table 6: Estimated changes in mean bidamount and the probability of an unclosed deal. For
all job-startprice categories considered, the tables display the expected changes in bidders’ mean bidamount
and in the probability of an unclosed deal in case non-price information gets concealed. All auctions were
conducted during the second half of 2008. The number of auctions and bootstrapped standard errors are
given in parentheses. Significance niveaus are reported by stars: ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%.
significantly. The reason is that in case non-price information gets concealed, bidders are no
longer aware of their relative strength respectively weakness with respect to their quality.
This leads to lower prices of high-quality bidders, and higher prices of low-quality bidders.
Due to this opposite development the average price does not change significantly.
In categories “painting” and “moving” in case non-price information gets concealed the
outside option is likely to be chosen more often. The reason is that with increasing prices
the outside option becomes more attractive to buyers. In contrast, in category “car repairs”
there is a pronounced decrease in the probability of unclosed deals. As just mentioned,
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Changes in buyers’ aggregate welfare
Startprice- Job-category
category Moving Painting Car
2 -0.3% -3.2% ∗∗ 0.6%
(e 101-200) (1.0%, 2,418 auct.) (1.3%, 1,509 auct.) (4.9%, 700 auct.)
3 -1.3% ∗∗ -4.0% ∗∗∗ 14.7% ∗∗
(e 201-300) (0.6%, 1,692 auct.) (0.9%, 1,578 auct.) (6.4%, 480 auct.)
5 -3.4% ∗∗∗ -6.4% ∗∗∗ -1.7%
(e 401-500) (1.0%, 1,446 auct.) (1.5%, 1,312 auct.) (33.3%, 229 auct.)
Changes in platform turnover
Startprice- Job-category
category Moving Painting Car
2 1.0% -1.3% 1.1%
(e 101-200) (1.0%, 2,418 auct.) (1.6%, 1,509 auct.) (4.9%, 700 auct.)
3 0.2% -2.0% ∗ 13.3% ∗∗
(e 201-300) (0.9%, 1,692 auct.) (1.1%, 1,578 auct.) (6.0%, 480 auct.)
5 -1.3% -1.4% -4.4%
(e 401-500) (1.2%, 1,446 auct.) (1.5%, 1,312 auct.) (19.7%, 229 auct.)
Table 7: Estimated changes in buyers’ aggregate welfare and platform turnover in case non-
price information gets concealed from the bidders. For all job-startprice categories considered, the
tables display the expected changes in buyers’ welfare and in platform turnover in case non-price information
gets concealed. The percentage changes in welfare were derived by computing the monetary equivalent of the
total change of buyers’ welfare and then relating it to total auction turnover in the job-startprice-category
considered. All auctions were conducted during the second half of 2008. The number of auctions and
bootstrapped standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance niveaus are reported by stars: ***: 1%,
**: 5%, *: 10%.
concealment of non-price information leads to lower prices of high-quality bidders, and higher
prices of low-quality bidders. Thus, high-quality bidders become “cheaper” for the buyers,
which renders the outside option relatively less attractive. Therefore the relative number of
auctions in which deals remain unclosed drops.
Our results so far show that in categories where the influence of bidders’ non-price charac-
teristics on buyers’ decisions are weak (“painting” and “moving”), concealment of non-price
information leads to an increase in average prices and a decrease in the rate of successfully
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closed deals. In categories where bidders’ non-price characteristics are of quite strong influ-
enced on buyers’ decisions (“car repairs”), concealment of non-price information decreases
prices of high-quality bidders, which in turn fosters deals between buyers and bidders. Ac-
cordingly, as shown in table 7, when non-price information is concealed buyers’ aggregate
welfare in categories painting and moving decreases, whereas it increases in category “car
repair”.26
The online auction platform on which the auctions in our sample are conducted charges
a certain percentage of the price to which a deal is closed between a bidder and a buyer
as commission. That is, the earnings of the platform increase with the turnover created
in the auctions. The effect of concealment of non-price information on auction turnover is
ambiguous: In categories where bidders’ non-price characteristics are only of small influence
on buyers’ decisions (“painting” and “moving”), concealment of non-price information in-
creases prices but decreases the rate of successfully closed deals. In categories where bidders’
non-price characteristics strongly influence buyers’ decisions (“car repairs”), concealment of
non-price information increases the rate of successfully closed deals but decreases the prices
of high-quality bidders. The results displayed in table 7 show that for categories “painting”
and “moving”, where bidders’ non-price characteristics are only of small influence on buyers’
decisions, the effect of a decrease in the rate of successfully seems to be balanced by that
of an increase in prices. For category “car repairs” where bidders’ non-price characteristics
are of high importance for buyers’ decisions, the increase in the rate of successfully closed
deals outweighs the decrease in high-quality bidders’ prices, and turnover thus drops by up
to 13%.
 Robustness of our counterfactual results. The results of our counterfactual sim-
ulation are only meaningful if - although necessarily stylized - our theoretical framework
captures the fundamental mechanics of the application at hand sufficiently well. Our frame-
26The welfare changes displayed in table 7 are expressed in percentages of total revenues made (in
monetary terms) in the respective category during the observation period. Total revenues range from
around e 360,000 in job-category “moving”, startprice-category 5, to around e 34,000 in job-category “car”,
startprice-category 5.
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work abstracts from inter-auction dynamics, sniping and selection issues. In the following,
we discuss why neglecting these factors is justified for our application respectively how taking
them into account might alter our results.
We abstract from inter-auction dynamics, which means that we assume both buyers and
bidders not to behave strategically across auctions. We think this assumption is reasonable
for our application for two reasons: First, as during the time period considered each buyer
on average auctions off only one contract, we can exclude strategic inter-auction behavior
of buyers. Second, the probability of repeated encounters between bidders is quite low: On
average, a given bidder encounters only 12% of his rivals at least twice. Thus, it should be
reasonable to assume that, if at all, phenomenons like tacit collusion play a negligible role.
We also do not think that explicit collusion in a given auction plays a role: For once, bidders
are not able to communicate with each other on the online platform. Then, as shown on the
map in figure 3, most auctions are procuring jobs in large cities respectively metropolitan
areas. There, in contrast to rural areas, bidders should not know about the whole pool of
potential rivals, what makes interactions between them apart from that on the platform
unlikely.
A related but slightly different concern might be that some bidders behave strategically
across auctions due to capacity constraints, like in for example Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer
(2000). However, the auctions we consider are about smaller jobs which should take about
one to at most three days to complete, and in the time span we consider (half a year) the
average number of auction participations is around four. Thus, we do not think that capacity
constraints do play a major role here. To summarize, we think that modeling each auction
in an isolated manner is a reasonable approach for our application.
We further made the assumption that a bidding equilibrium emerges in each auction. In
particular, this assumption implies that dynamic phenomenons like sniping do not occur in
our application. Given the numbers in table 1 this assumption seems to be justified: On
average, the last bid is placed well before the end of an auction, meaning that sniping seems
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to play no role in our data. Thus, the assumption that in each auction in our application an
equilibrium is achieved should be justified.
A more critical assumption implicit in our model is that a change in the information struc-
ture does not affect the composition of auction participants. It might be that in categories
where bidders’ non-price characteristics are of low importance for the buyers’ decisions the
increase in prices due to concealed non-price information attracts additional bidders. This
would intensify competition, which in turn would force prices down again. Similarly, in cat-
egories where bidders’ non-price characteristics are of high importance to buyers’ decisions,
intensified price competition due to concealed non-price information might lead to bidders
dropping out of auctions. Both these changes in auction composition would work against
the results we presented above. However, we do not expect the effects of changes in auction
compositions due to concealment of non-price information to be large. The reason is that
auction participation is rather costless for bidders - after they paid the “fixed cost” of reg-
istering at the auction platform, auction participation is just a matter of a few clicks - that
is, a bidder’s (variable) cost from participating at an auction should be negligible relative
to his expected utility from participation both in case non-price information is public and
in case non-price information is concealed. Thus, we do not expect auction compositions to
change significantly in case non-price information gets concealed.
7 Conclusion
Non-binding reverse auctions are establishing as one of the most prominent tools for
electronic procurement activities both of firms and government organizations. Whereas
in non-binding auctions typically no structure is imposed on the buyer’s decision process,
important design questions arise, however, with respect to the information regime throughout
the bidding process. We added to the understanding of this auction format by analyzing the
effects of different designs of the information structure of an open non-binding auction. In
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particular, under the assumption that prices are always visible, we examined what effects
disclosure respectively concealment of information about bidders’ non-price characteristics
has on the aggregate welfare of the buyers.
After establishing a formal framework, we first observed that buyers prefer that informa-
tional arrangement which creates higher competitive pressure among bidders. As we showed,
which of the informational regimes indeed induces more competitive pressure crucially de-
pends on the precise situation considered. Thus, from a theory point of view none of the
regimes dominates.
To obtain further insights on the impact of the information regimes in non-binding auc-
tions for real market situations, we then conducted an empirical analysis based on an exten-
sive data set from a large European online procurement platform. The informational setup
on this platform is such that bidders are informed about each other’s non-price characteris-
tics. Building on our formal framework, we performed a counterfactual welfare analysis to
assess the consequences of concealing non-price information from the bidders. We find that
our theoretical result - that the effect of concealment of non-price information depends on
how strong buyers weigh bidders’ non-price characteristics - is of economic significance for
applications in the field. For auction categories where bidders non-price characteristics are of
high importance for the decisions of the buyers, in case non-price information was concealed
we would expect buyers’ welfare to increase by up to 15%. Also, we would expect turnover
to increase by up to 13%. In contrast, for auction categories where bidders non-price charac-
teristics are of low importance for the decisions of the buyers, in case non-price information
was concealed we would expect buyers’ welfare to decrease by up to 6% and turnover to
decrease by up to 2%. The latter is the case in the by far most popular job-category on the
platform.
The final policy recommendation implied by those results clearly depends very much
on the final objectives of the online platform. Especially for business models in the very
dynamic online markets, often rapid growth is much more important than instantaneous
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profits. In a recent interview for HBR IdeaCast from Harvard Business Review, Jeff Bezos,
CEO of Amazon.com, for example states: “Percentage margins are not one of the things we
are seeking to optimize. It’s the absolute dollar-free cash flow per share that you want to
maximize, [...]” And later on: “[W]e believe by keeping our prices very, very low, we earn
trust with customers over time, and that actually does maximize free cash flow over the long
term.” 27 A formal consideration of the dynamic aspects such as the long run profitability
of firm growth in a specific sector by far exceeds the bounds of our structural analysis.
Nevertheless, our analysis can contribute to questions arising in this broader context. If the
most challenging task to achieve the long run growth objectives of the online platform indeed
is to attract as many buyers as possible (even at the expense of smaller short-run profits),
then our results clearly show that the current information regime to reveal all non-price
information is the one to best implement this objective, as it maximizes buyers’ welfare in
the most popular auction categories.
27Source: Interview with Jeff Bezos, HBR IdeaCast from Harvard Business Review, January 3, 2013.
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A Appendix
A.1 Illustration: No information structure dominates the other
As the firms’ first order conditions given in (3) and (6) are transcendental given any stan-
dard assumption about the distribution of the error terms i, it is impossible to derive closed
form solutions for the equilibrium prices in both the information and the no information
case. In order to demonstrate that no information structure weakly dominates the other we
thus resort to the use of numerical simulations.
We look at an auction with two bidding firms. The cost of the firms are c = (c1, c2) =
(0, 1). We make the assumption that the error terms i are iid type I extreme value dis-
tributed, and that the distribution of quality f(qj) is discrete: q1 shall be drawn with prob-
ability 0.1, q2 with probability 0.9.
Then for q = (q1, q2) = (0, 1) we get EU − E˜U = 0.75. Thus, for these parameter
values the buyer prefers the information case over the no information case. In contrast, for
q = (0, 3) we get EU− E˜U = −0.34. With these parameter values the buyer prefers the no
information case over the information case.
A.2 Derivation of analytical results
We assume 2 − 1 to follow a uniform distribution with mean zeor and variance ν, and
˜2 − ˜1 to follow a uniform distribution with mean zero and variance ν˜. It holds that ν˜ ≥ ν.
Accordingly, the cumulative distribution function of 2 − 1 is given as
F2−1(x) =

0 for x < −√12ν
1
2
+ 1√
12ν
x for −√12ν ≤ x < √12ν
1 for x ≥ √12ν,
(A1)
and that of ˜2 − ˜1 as
F˜2−˜1(x) =

0 for x < −√12ν˜
1
2
+ 1√
12ν˜
x for −√12ν˜ ≤ x < √12ν˜
1 for x ≥ √12ν˜.
(A2)
For the sake of exposition in the following we focus on the parameter space for which we
get interior solutions. That is the parameter space for which both −√12ν ≤ p∗2−q2−p∗1−q1 <√
12ν and −√12ν˜ ≤ p˜∗2− p˜∗1 <
√
12ν˜. p∗i and p˜
∗
i are the equilibrium prices in the information
respectively the no information case. These conditions hold if 0 ≤ c2 − c1 < 3
√
12ν˜ and
−3√12ν + (c2 − c1) < q2 − q1 ≤ 3
√
12ν + (c2 − c1). Note that for the parameter space
depicted in figure 1 we get interior solutions. In the complementary parameter space the
situation in at least one of the two information cases turns deterministic, as due to the
limited support of 2− 1 respectively ˜2− ˜1 randomness in the error terms no longer has an
effect on the buyer’s decision (as perceived by the bidders). This alters the position of the
buyer’s indifference line but has no effect on our basic finding that for large cost differences
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and small quality differences the buyer prefers the information case, while for small cost
differences and large quality differences he prefers the no information case.
The firms’ winning probabilities in the information case are
P1(p,q) = P (2 − 1 ≤ p2 − q2 − p1 + q1) = F2−1(p2 − q2 − p1 + q1),
P2(p,q) = P (2 − 1 > p2 − q2 − p1 + q1) = 1− F2−1(p2 − q2 − p1 + q1).
If the Pj in the first order conditions (3) are expressed using the approximation (A2), it is
straightforward to solve these systems after the equilibrium prices p∗:
p∗1 =
1
3
(2c1 + c2)− 1
3
(q2 − q1) +
√
3ν,
p∗2 =
1
3
(c1 + 2c2) +
1
3
(q2 − q1) +
√
3ν.
The firms’ winning probabilities in the no information case are
P˜1(p,q) = P (˜2 − ˜1 ≤ p˜2 − p˜1) = F˜2−˜1(p˜2 − p˜1),
P˜2(p,q) = P (˜2 − ˜1 > p˜2 − p˜1) = 1− F˜2−˜1(p˜2 − p˜1).
Using the first order conditions (6), it follows that the equilibrium prices in the no information
case are given as
p˜∗1 =
1
3
(2c1 + c2) +
√
3ν˜,
p˜∗2 =
1
3
(c1 + 2c2) +
√
3ν˜.
From simply comparing (p∗1, p
∗
2) to (p˜
∗
1, p˜
∗
2), it follows that
p∗1 = p˜
∗
1 −
1
3
(q2 − q1)−
√
3(
√
ν˜ −√ν),
p∗2 = p˜
∗
2 +
1
3
(q2 − q1)−
√
3(
√
ν˜ −√ν).
According to Small and Rosen (1981) the change in the buyer’s expected utility from a
change in the information structure can be computed as
∆EU = EU− E˜U =
∫ (W1,W2)
(W˜1,W˜2)
{P1(W1,W2)dW1 + [1− P1(W1,W2)]dW2} ,
where W1 = q1−p1, W2 = q2−p2, (W˜1, W˜2) = (q1− p˜∗1, q2− p˜∗2), (W1,W2) = (q1−p∗1, q2−p∗2)
50
and P1(W1,W2) =
1
2
+
√
12ν(W1 −W2). Some algebra delivers
EU− E˜U = 1
3
√
12ν
(q2 − q1) [(c2 − c1)− 2(q2 − q1)]
+3(2
√
νν˜ + ν˜ − 3ν)
+(
√
ν˜
2
√
ν
− 1
2
)(c2 + c1 − q2 − q1),
as stated in the main body of the text.
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A.3 Counterfactual estimates
Startprice- Job-category
category Moving Painting Car
2 Mean bidamount 1.0% 2.5% 0.8%
(e 101-200) (0.4%) (0.4%) (1.0%)
Freq. outside option 0.3% 3.9% -0.6%
(1.0%) (1.2%) (3.6%)
Aggr. buyer welfare -0.3% -3.2% 0.6%
(1.0%) (1.2%) (4.9%)
Platform turnover 1.0% -1.3% 1.1%
(1.0%) (1.4%) (4.9%)
3 Mean bidamount 1.5% 3.0% 0.5%
(e 201-300) (0.3%) (0.5%) (1.4%)
Freq. outside option 1.6% 5.8% -10.9%
(0.9%) (1.2%) (4.5%)
Aggr. buyer welfare -1.3% -4.0% 14.7%
(0.6%) (0.9%) (6.4%)
Platform turnover 0.2% -2.0% 13.3%
(0.9%) (1.0%) (6.0%)
4 Mean bidamount 1.6% 4.2% 0.7%
(e 301-400) (0.5%) (0.6%) (1.9%)
Freq. outside option 1.0% 6.7% 3.6%
(1.5%) (1.4%) (4.7%)
Aggr. buyer welfare -0.7% -3.9% -3.3%
(1.1%) (0.9%) (5.4%)
Platform turnover 0.3% -1.1% -6.4%
(1.3%) (1.2%) (6.5%)
5 Mean bidamount 2.7% 5.2% 0.9%
(e 401-500) (0.5%) (0.8%) (7.3%)
Freq. outside option 4.2% 7.3% 1.4%
(1.4%) (1.7%) (9.8%)
Aggr. buyer welfare -3.4% -6.4% -1.7%
(1.0%) (1.5%) (33.3%)
Platform turnover -1.3% -1.4% -4.4%
(1.2%) (1.5%) (19.7%)
Table 8: Changes in case non-price information gets concealed from the bidders. For all job-
startprice categories considered, the table displays the changes in the mean bidamount, the frequency with
which the outside option is chosen, the aggregate welfare of the buyers, and the platform turnover in case non-
price information gets concealed. All auctions were conducted during the second half of 2008. Bootstrapped
standard errors are given in parentheses.
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